Forbes offers this interesting analysis of efforts by the French government to assimilate or "institutionalize" Muslims in the country. The article begins:

France's government recently launched efforts aimed at institutionalizing Islam in the country, in order to keep open channels of communication and avoid a fundamentalist drift. Although the measures are innovative, the challenges they face are great.

A Los Angeles area radio personality is offering a conditional apology in response to demands that he make amends for poking fun at the deaths of hundreds in a Hajj stampede:

A Los Angeles radio personality said Monday he would apologize for an on-air skit that made fun of the deaths of hundreds of Muslims, but only if an Islamic civil rights group denounces terrorism and acknowledges Israel's right to exist.

Previous post here.

Muslim civil rights groups are demanding that a Los Angeles-area radio show apologize for making light of a Hajj Stampede in Mecca that claimed the lives of hundreds of worshippers.

Bill Handel, a host on KFI-AM 640, aired a segment entitled, the "Annual Stampede Report." According to the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR):

Handel imitated the people screaming and then joked that the Muslims at the pilgrimage should use a helicopter to monitor pilgrimage traffic, as is done in Los Angeles with the freeways.

The group quoted Handel as saying: "This is Mahmoud Nolan. Hajj in the Sky. There is an accident. ... Ali lost his sandal on the on-ramp to the Martin Luther King Jr. freeway."

A CAIR spokesperson said in a statement:

"The deaths of hundreds of people engaged in religious observances is no laughing matter.... KFI needs to distance itself from Mr. Handel's unbelievable insensitivity by issuing a formal apology and a reprimand."

Interestingly, KFI-AM is owned by Clear Channel Communications, the same corporation that booted Howard Stern off the air in some markets for his allegedly indecent material.

Canadian Harmeet Singh Sooden [pictured, on the right] is one of four men held hostage in Iraq since November. While reports have indicated that the group are "Christian peace activists," Sooden's name suggests that he is a Sikh. No reports have, as of yet, identified Sooden as a Sikh despite his characteristically Sikh name, particularly his middle name of Singh.

See report here.

"Just when I thought I had being a nigger in America down pat, now I'm a terrorist.” —Yusuf Muhajir

Read his compelling story here.

United Press International is reporting that the The Herbert Hoover School in Berlin, Germany "has decided to ban foreign language classes in order to improve pupils German language skills." The article continues:

Ninety percent of the school's students have foreign-born parents... and each class features between eight and ten different languages.

Since last September, however, 370 pupils have not been allowed to speak in their native tongue at school. The rule has entered the school's code of conduct, agreed to by parents' representatives and school authorities.

School headmaster Jutta Steinkamp told Deutsche Welle her pupils' command of German has improved substantially over the past few months.

"We have introduced this ban to enable our students to take part in German society through speaking and understanding the language properly," Steinkamp said, adding it was necessary to speak German well in order to get a job later in life.

Relatedly, Syed Atiq ul Hassan offers this interesting essay regarding the assimiation of minority communities, with particular emphasis on Muslims in Australia. He argues:

the minority cannot be assimilated according to the wishes of the majority. It is a natural and long-term process where minority people gradually adopt the habits, traditions and other social elements of majority on the basis of societal and communal needs and where the minority people find no harm their heritage, culture and faith. However, in this process of integration and assimilation, the minority always and systematically loose the derivations of culture and in some cases the faith.

A newspaper in South Dakota offers this profile of Akal Security, a company that has been at the forefront of security services after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and which is owned and operated by Sikhs in New Mexico. According to the article, the president of Akal stated that: “If you have a federal courthouse, we’re already there.” Indeed:

Akal contracts to provide security for federal courthouses nationwide.

The company also secures airports, utilities, railroads, cruise ships and other private clients.

Akal’s government clients also include 10 Army bases and 18 Air Force bases....

An article in this weekend's Washington Post describes the difficulties of being a Muslim cop in London. While Muslims are encouraged to join the force, they face criticism from some members of their own faith (who consider them sell-outs: "You are a Muslim. You should not be working for the police.") and from the general public (who consider them "foreigners").

This interesting discussion is taking place on StopTheACLU.com. The comments section is particularly worth reading.

A Fulbright scholar writes that more American students are taking interest in learning Arabic, which he argues is a very positive development:

An obvious benefit of this trend is the face-to-face interaction being experienced by a new generation of Americans. Shared classrooms cultivate understanding in a common language. Helen Keller wrote that ``the highest result of education is tolerance,'' which, if true, means that a generation more tolerant and better informed about the Arab-Muslim world is climbing America's ranks.

Law professor Jeffrey Rosen offers these thoughts regarding the confirmation of Circuit Judge Samuel Alito the the U.S. Supreme Court. He presents perhaps the most effective and articulate criticism of Judge Alito's legal judgments as a Justice Department official and his performance at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. Professor Rosen, in a single op-ed, argues more forcefully and convincingly than eight Democratic senators who had three rounds in which to challenge Judge Alito.

Professor Rosen concludes:

For moderates who have been inclined to give the Bush administration the benefit of the doubt in the war on terrorism, the recent revelations about the scope of a clearly illegal domestic spying program represent a turning point. The administration's unabashed effort to defend its conduct with implausible legal arguments--such as the claim that Congress authorized a program that federal law obviously forbids--have exhausted any reservoir of trust among open-minded citizens. Even if Congress makes its views crystal clear, the administration has reserved the right to ignore any laws that it finds inconvenient. The only thing standing between the president and unchecked power, therefore, is the Supreme Court. That's why, for Republican as well as Democratic senators who believe judges should interpret the law, not invent it, Alito's testimony about executive power must be a cause for concern.

[HT: How Appealing]

A Wisconsin Circuit Court Judge will rule next week on the constitutionality of the state's hate crime law, which enhances penalties for intentionally selecting the victim of a crime, "in whole or in part," on the basis of the victim's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry. The ruling will settle a case involving two white firefighters charged with a hate crime against a black man.

The attorneys for the firefighters argued in part:

[T]he state's current hate crime law "has never been addressed by an appellate court or the U.S. Supreme Court." [Also,] the law [is] overbroad.... [T]he law had a "chilling effect" on a person expressing their free speech. The law, as written, creates a "fear of being prosecuted...." [And,] under the current law, anyone who is in a bar fight in which insulting terms are being hurled back and forth could be charged with a hate crime.

On the other hand, the District Attorney argued in part:

[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has upheld Wisconsin's hate crime law [and that] the law is not about speech but about the actions of a person who selects a victim based on that person's race, sex or religion.

The complaint filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights and several individuals.

The complaint filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), ACLU of Michigan, Council on American-Islamic Relations, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Greenpeace, and several individuals, including writer Christopher Hitchens.

In responding to a recent court ruling that "Wayne State University police should not have arrested a student for carrying knives that were part of his Sikh religious beliefs" [see previous post here], columnist Erik Gable argues that 1) "There's no real reason to prevent [the Sikh student] from wearing a kirpan [a ceremonial Sikh dagger]; doing so would be denying him the right to follow a tenet of his religion that harms nobody," 2) while "[t]he judge's intent clearly was to protect the Sikh student's freedom to practice his religion..., he also granted followers of Sikhism a privilege that members of no other religion can enjoy [a]nd that can be seen as its own form of religious discrimination," and 3) "The law should be applied equally to everyone, regardless of their religion [because] nobody is harmed by failure to obey a law...."

In short, Gable argues that religious exemptions are in effect forms of religious discrimination and, as an alternative to this unacceptable result, anyone should be permitted to disobey the law in question so long as "nobody is harmed by failure to obey" it.

Gable is thus advocating a legal system that adheres to the Harm Principle - that the only laws which should be enforced are those which prevent harm to others. This libertarian viewpoint extends beyond laws implicating religious beliefs and can negate many laws on the books, particularly those based on a moral code (i.e., harm to moral sensibilities, or mere offense).

To the extent that Gable contends that religious exemptions amount to religious discrimination, Sikhs are not given "preferential treatment." Members of other faiths who have a similar sincerely held belief can be granted the same exemption.

Moreover, Gable may want to read the Supreme Court's opinion in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905). There, the Court noted that:

[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.

Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25. In other words, religious exemptions are permitted because they are based on sincerely held beliefs, not a capricious decision by an individual to disobey the law because he does not find it to be wise or because adherence would be inconvenient. For the state to sanction disobedience based on simple objection, rather than religious belief, would be for the state to invite all individuals to disobey the law whenever they please (perhaps unless the law in question prevents harm). Allowing religious exemptions to generally applicable laws thus strikes a balance between an individual's religious freedoms along with concern for the common good and general welfare.

South Carolina: "South Carolina doesn't have a hate crime law, but the recent lynching of a black teen has some thinking the Palmetto State needs one.... 'In these days and times there should be a hate crime law,' said Charles Montgomery of the Cherokee County NAACP. 'Whether it's black or white or against gays and lesbians.'"

Alabama: "A state legislator determined to strengthen the state's hate crime laws is hoping his proposed amendment is on the fast track for approval. Rep. Alvin Holmes, D-Montgomery, said the House Judiciary Committee is planning next week to take up the bill, which would amend the current hate crime statute to include sexual orientation. That would mean anyone convicted of committing a crime against a person because of his or her sexual orientation would receive a more severe penalty."

From the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings on Judge Samuel Alito's nomination to the Supreme Court:

BIDEN: Do you think the president has the authority to invade Iran tomorrow without getting permission from the people, from the United States Congress, absent him being able to show there's an immediate threat to our national security?

ALITO: Well, that's a question that I don't think is settled by -- the whole issue of the extent of the president's authority to authorize the use of military force without congressional approval has been the subject of a lot of debate.

The Constitution divides the powers relating to making war between the president and the Congress. It gives Congress the power to declare war, and obviously that means something. It gives Congress the power of the purse, and obviously military operations can't be carried out for any length of time without congressional appropriations. Congress is given the power to raise and support an Army, to maintain a Navy, to make the rules for governing the land and the naval forces.

The president has the power of the commander in chief. And I think there's been general agreement and the Prize cases support the authority of the president to take military action on his own in the case of an emergency when there is not time for Congress to react.

BIDEN: Is that the deciding question, if the Congress does not have the time to act?

ALITO: Well, the Prize cases I think are read to go as far as to say that in that limited circumstance the president can act without congressional approval.

A lot of scholars say that what's important as far as congressional approval is not the form, it's not whether it's a formal declaration of war or not, it's whether there is authorization in one form or another.

The war powers resolution was obviously an expression of the view on the part of Congress....

I've been trying to describe what I understand the authorities to say in this area. Generally, when this issue has come up, or variations of this issue have come up in relation to a number of recent wars -- there were a number of efforts to raise issues relating to this in relation to the war in Vietnam. There was an effort to raise it in relation to our military operations in the former Yugoslavia. In most of those instances they didn't -- in most of those instances were -- the cases were dismissed by the lower courts under the so-called political question doctrine that you described earlier....

BIDEN: So it's really kind of important, whether or not you think the president does not need the authority of the United States Congress to wage a war where there's not an imminent threat against the United States. And that's my question.

ALITO: And, Senator, if I'm confirmed and if this comes before me -- or perhaps it could come before me on the Court of Appeals -- the first issue would be the political question doctrine that I've described.

But if we were to get beyond that, what I can tell you is that I have not studied these authorities and it is not my practice to just express an opinion on a constitutional question.... including particularly one that is as momentous as this. I've set out my understanding of what the Constitution does in allocating powers relating to war between the executive and Congress, and some of what some of the leading authorities have said on this question. But beyond that -- and I haven't read Professor Yoo's book or anything that he's written on this issue -- I would have to study the question.

***

FEINSTEIN: What I'm saying is, that we set up a legal procedure by which you do it and we set two exigent circumstances to excuse a president from having to do it. Therefore, doesn't that law prevail?

ALITO: As I said, I think the threshold question is interpreting the scope of that and it might turn out to be an open-and-shut argument. It might turn out to be very complicated argument. I would not presume to voice an opinion on the question here, in particular because I have not studied it in the depth that I would have to study it before reaching a judicial decision on the matter.

Then, depending on how that issue was resolved, it would be -- it might be necessary to go on to the constitutional question. I think you exactly outlined where that would fall under Justice Jackson's method of analyzing these questions. This would be in the category in which, if it was determined that there was not statutory authorization...

FEINSTEIN: There was. No statutory authorization to wiretap, right?

ALITO: If it was determined that there was statutory authorization, then I do not know what the constitutional issue would...

FEINSTEIN: But, if there wasn't...

ALITO: There might be a constitutional issue. Let me stop there.

There would be a Fourth Amendment issue, obviously.

If you went beyond -- if you determined that there was not statutory authorization, then as far as the issue of presidential power is concerned, you would be in Justice Jackson's scheme, in the category where the president -- you would have to determine if this is the argument that is made; whether the president's power, inherent powers, the powers given to the president under Article II, are sufficient, even taking away congressional authorization, the area where the president is asserting a power to do something in the face of an explicit congressional determination to the contrary.

FEINSTEIN: Now, in my lay mind, the way I interpret that -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- is that you essentially have a conflict, and that it hasn't been decided whether one trumps the other.

ALITO: I think that's close to the point that I was trying to make. The way Justice Jackson described it was that you have whatever executive power the president has minus what Congress has taken away by enacting the statute.

FEINSTEIN: Even though you have a statutory prohibition, even a criminal prohibition?

ALITO: Well, I'm not suggesting how the determination would come out. I think that it is implicit in the way Justice Jackson outlined this that presidential -- he said it expressly -- presidential power is at its lowest in this situation, where the president is claiming the authority to do something that Congress has prohibited.

From the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings on Judge Samuel Alito's nomination to the Supreme Court:

LEAHY: [Justice Thomas] argued the government's power could not be balanced away by the court and there is no occasion to balance the competing interests.

Which one is right, Justice O'Connor or Justice Thomas? They're quite a bit different.

ALITO: Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion of the court.

The first question that she addressed in Hamdi was whether it was lawful to detain Hamdi, and it was a statutory question, and it was a question whether it was -- whether he was being detained in violation of what is often referred to as the anti-detention statute, which was passed to prevent a repetition of the Japanese internment that occurred during World War II. And she concluded that the authorization for the use of military force constituted an authorization for detention.

And then she went on to the issue of the constitutional procedures that would have to be followed before someone could be detained. And she looked to standard procedural due process law in this area and identified some of the requirements that would have to be followed before someone could be detained.

And now issues have arisen about the identity of the tribunal that is to make a determination about detaining people who are taken into custody during the war on terrorism.

And that's one of the issues that's working its way through the court system.

***

LEAHY: Which decision do you personally agree with, hers or the dissent by Justice Thomas?

ALITO: I think that the war powers are divided between the executive branch and the Congress. I think that's a starting point to look at in this area.

The president is the commander in chief, and he has authority in the area of foreign affairs and is recognized in Supreme Court decisions as the sole organ in the country for conducting foreign affairs....

I certainly don't think that the president has a blank check in time of war. He does have the responsibility as the commander in chief, which is an awesome responsibility.

***

DURBIN: So when Hamdi draws that line and Justice O'Connor makes that statement about no blank check for a president in times of war when it comes to rights of American citizens and there's an dissent from Justice Thomas who argues unitary executive, scope of powers, more power to the president, you are coming down on the majority side and not on the Thomas side of that argument.

DURBIN: Is that fair to say?

ALITO: Well, I'm not coming down -- I don't recall that Justice Thomas uses the term of unitary executive in his dissent. It doesn't stick out in my mind that he did. If he did, he's using it there in a sense that's different from the sense in which I was using the term.

According to the Sikh Coalition:

In a dramatic hearing, five men convicted in the brutal bias-related assault on Rajinder Singh Khalsa [pictured] received sentences ranging from five days in jail to two years in state prison. In addition to incarceration, three of the five attackers were sentenced to a total of 350 hours of community service with the Sikh Coalition.

Rajinder Singh Khalsa noted:

I am happy these men will do community service with the Sikh Coalition. When they learn about Sikhs, they will see that we are a peaceful religion.... I am also very thankful to the Queens Country District Attorney’s Office for their hard work to prosecute this case. They were with me every step of the way.

From the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings on Judge Samuel Alito's nomination to the Supreme Court:

SPECTER: Do you agree with Justice O'Connor's statement quoted frequently yesterday from Hamdi that, quote, "We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the nation's citizens," when she was citing the Youngstown case? Do you agree with that?

ALITO: Absolutely. That's a very important principle. Our Constitution applies in times of peace and in times of war, and it protects the rights of Americans under all circumstances.

SPECTER: You made a speech at Pepperdine where you said, in commenting about the decision of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan, that, quote, "the Constitution applies even in an extreme emergency." The government made a, quote, "broad and unwise argument that the Bill of Rights simply don't apply during wartime." Do you stand by that statement?

ALITO: I certainly do, Senator.

The Bill of Rights applies at all times. And it's particularly important that we adhere to the Bill of Rights in times of war and in times of national crisis, because that's when there's the greatest temptation to depart from them.

***

ALITO: The Youngstown Steel case [] is certainly an example where President Truman thought that it was necessary to seize the steel mills so as not to interfere with the war effort in Korea, but the Supreme Court said that this was an overstepping of the bounds of executive authority.

There was a reference to United States v. Nixon, where the Supreme Court said that the president of the United States had to comply with a subpoena, with a grand jury subpoena, for documents. And they stood up for what they understood the law to mean, despite the fact that there must have been great pressure against them in another direction.

So when situations like that come up, it is the responsibility of the judiciary to hold fast.

***

FEINGOLD: How does a court decide whether to rely on the facts presented to it by the executive in a national security case?

ALITO: What I was doing in that talk at Pepperdine was framing that question. And it's a lot easier to frame the question and to ask students to think about it and give me their reactions than it is to answer it.

We've had examples of instance in which the judiciary in the past has had to confront this issue of reviewing factual presentations of the executive in times of national crisis. And there have been instances in which the judiciary has accepted -- and I'm thinking of the Japanese internment cases -- has accepted, which were one of the great constitutional tragedies that our country has experienced -- has accepted factual presentations by the political -- by the executive branch that turned out not to be true and from my reading of what went on were not believed to be true by some high-ranking executive officials at the time.

But there is the problem of judicial fact-finding, which I was talking about earlier, and the context of things that may be taking place on the battlefield, for example, or things that are taking place in wartime probably are more difficult for the judiciary to evaluate than other factual questions.

FEINGOLD: I do appreciate your reference in the Koramatsu to a case and the problem there and how this is going to become an even more serious issue.

***

GRAHAM: Who is better able to determine if an enemy combatant properly held has ongoing intelligence value to our country? Is it the military or a judge?

ALITO: On intelligence matters I would think that is an issue -- that is an area where the judiciary doesn't have expertise. But we do get into this issue I was discussing with Senator Feingold about the degree to which the balance between the judiciary's performing its function in cases involving individual rights and its desire not to intrude into areas where it lacks expertise, particularly in times of war and national crisis.

***

ALITO: The courts do not have expertise in foreign affairs or in military affairs. And they certainly should recognize that. And that is one powerful consideration in addressing legal issues that may come up in this context.

But there is the other powerful consideration that it is the responsibility of the courts to protect individual rights in cases that are properly before the court, cases where they have jurisdiction in one way or another, cases that are fit for judicial resolution.

According to the Associated Press:

A judge says Wayne State University police should not have arrested a student for carrying knives that were part of his Sikh religious beliefs.

Sukhpreet Singh Garcha, 23, was arrested Aug. 14 for carrying a 10-inch knife on his hip and a 5-inch knife concealed in his waistband. He was charged with violating Detroit's knife ordinance, which prohibits carrying knives with blades longer than 3 inches.

Carrying a ritual knife known as a kirpan at all times is a basic tenet of Sikhism, an Indian-based faith with an estimated 25 million followers worldwide....

Detroit 36th District Court Judge Rudy Serra ruled last month that the knife ordinance was intended to apply to people carrying "a knife as a weapon or for some unlawful purpose."

Since Garcha was carrying the kirpan for religious reasons, the ordinance did not apply, the judge said....

Wayne State Public Safety Director Anthony Holt said campus officers will not arrest Garcha or other Sikh students who carry a kirpan, The Detroit News reported Tuesday.

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch is reporting on fliers that were distributed around the nation for "mail-order nutrients" that have the headline, "Get a Turban for Durbin!," a reference to Illinois Senator Dick Durbin.

The details are in an article entitled, "Muslim bashing seemingly in vogue."

Law Professor Cass Sunstein offers this very interesting review of former Justice Department official and current law professor John Yoo's book, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11. Professor Yoo has been credited for arguing, while in the Justice Department, that the government has the legal authority to engage in domestic spying without judicial approval.

Professor Sunstein begins his article by noting:

After the attacks of September 11, constitutional law was bound to change. Serious threats to national security have always had large effects on the nation's understanding of its founding document. A major reason is that the president's lawyers tend to see the Constitution as a highly flexible instrument, permitting their client to do what he thinks must be done. Francis Biddle, attorney general under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, said that "the Constitution has never greatly bothered any wartime president." Courts often ratify the decisions of wartime presidents. Roosevelt himself placed Japanese-Americans on the West Coast in internment camps, and the Supreme Court upheld his decision.

The Hindu Forum of Britain (HFB), "which represents 260 Hindu organisations in Britain," claims that "A rising number of Hindus are the victims of hate crimes, partly as a backlash from the London suicide bombings," according to the Independent (UK).

Specifically, a representative from the HFB said:

"hate crime" incidents ranged from verbal and physical attacks on worshippers to graffiti and vandalism at Hindu temples. In one of the most recent attacks, paving slabs with swastikas scratched on them were thrown through the windows at a hall in Basingstoke, Hampshire, while a religious meeting was taking place.

James Yee, a third-generation Chinese-American and former Muslim chaplain for Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, has authored a new book, "For God and Country: Faith and Patriotism Under Fire," in which he describes his experiences in Gitmo and the manner in which he was treated by the government.

In particular, "federal agents accused him of spying because some personal papers — phone numbers, a to-do list, notes about Syria — were mistaken for classified documents." As a result, "He was taken to the Navy brig at Charleston, S.C., and held for 76 days in solitary confinement." The spying charges were dropped "for lack of evidence," however he was later charged with "adultery and having pornography on his computer." These charges, too, were dropped.

Yee writes

"I came to understand just how craven the people behind this ordeal were. This was just another attempt to turn public attention away from the real questions that my case raised — civil liberties and what was happening inside Guantanamo — and steer it toward accusations that would sensationalize the hearing and in the process humiliate me."